A theoretical framework of Maritime Air Power

Maritim luftmakt har siden luftmaktens tilblivelse falt mellom forsvarsgrenenes fokus og doktriner. Dette på grunn av kamp mellom forsvarsgrener om innflytelse og makt, så vel som teoretikeres og utdanningsinstitusjoners naturlige interesse for enten sjømakt eller luftmakt. Forfatteren argumenterer her for at maritim luftmakt må forståes som både sjømakt og luftmakt. Det foreslås i denne artikkelen et helhetlig teoretisk rammeverk hvor sjømaktsteori legger grunnlaget for å forstå den maritime luftmaktens mål og hensikt. Basert på dette utledes et naturlig sett med kapabiliteter: Informasjonsutnyttelse, overflate-, undervanns- og luftkrigføring, samt styrkeprojeksjon. Fra disse kapabilitetene, som er varige og robuste, sorteres både varige og nye roller av utøvd luftmakt – avhengig av situasjon og teknologisk utvikling. For å forstå maritim luftmakt er det fundamentalt og vel så viktig å forstå det sjømilitære filosofiske teoretiske grunnlaget som å forstå den tekniske og taktiske utøvelsen av luftmakt, og vice-a-versa

Trenchard and Slessor : on the supremacy of air power over sea power

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NATO’s Comprehensive Approach: Still Something for the Future?

Paper presented at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NDCSC) Doctrine Conference, Oslo, 25–26 June 2014.For more than a decade, the ideal and thoughts of a more ‘comprehensive approach’ to handle complex conflicts and state-building has been the focus of both academic think-tanks, politicians, and civilian and military actors in the field. NATO has worked to conceptualize these ideas in a directive for Comprehensive Approach since 2010. This strong focus on ‘comprehensive approach’ is largely positive, and was asked for by politicians and think-tanks from the early 2000. However, we argue that NATOs conceptualization of the general thoughts to a NATO concept, or maybe doctrine have some unintended negative impacts on the broad consensus about ‘comprehensiveness’ which may rather hamper rather than strengthen civil-military cooperation, despite good intentions. We support the ideal of comprehensiveness, but find NATOs conceptualisation troublesome and worthy a discussio

Land based air power or aircraft carriers? The British debate about maritime air power in the 1960s

Numerous studies, books, and articles have been written on Britains retreat from its former empire in the 1960s. Journalists wrote about it at the time, many people who were involved wrote about it in the immediate years that followed, and historians have tried to put it all together. The issues of foreign policy at the strategic level and the military operations that took place in this period have been especially well covered. However, the question of military strategic alternatives in this important era of British foreign policy has been less studied. This dissertation discusses such high-profile projects as the TSR.2 and F.111, prospective VTOL aircraft and not least the CVA-01 fleet carrier, but most of all it focuses on the issue of military strategy. The rivalry between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force was largely about the questions of carrier aviation versus land-based air power – and which strategic option would best answer the British need to maintain influence as the garrisons were being scaled down. The Royal Navy argued for replacement fleet carriers for their mobile seaborne strategy, while the Royal Air Force argued that land-based air power would be as effective and far less costly. By using this underlying strategic debate as the framework for understanding more specific debates on aircraft, ships and weapon systems, this dissertation aims to bring new light to our understanding of the dramatic restructuring and altered priorities these two military services saw during the 1960s. The story may be divided into three broad periods: From 1960 until mid 1963, it was a conceptual debate on ‘Carrier Task Forces’ and a concrete alternative ‘Island Strategy’. This ended in July 1963 with a Cabinet decision in favour of new fleet carriers. However, the Royal Air Force and the Treasury kept fighting this decision. Their continued resistance, together with the new Labour Government with Denis Healey as Secretary of State for Defence, changed the decision of 1963. The highpoint of the debate on carrier aviation and land-based air power came during 1965-66, ending with the decision of February 1966 to cancel the CVA-01 and gradually phase out the existing carrier fleet. Denis Healey then used the arguments for land-based air power as a rationale for the decision. The dissertation rounds off with a discussion of the planned phase-out of the existing carrier fleet. However, the story saw a different end than planned, as new strategic challenges in home waters came about and the evolving VTOL Harrier aircraft and the ‘through-deck cruisers’ gave new possibilities. This is a historical study of the British debate about maritime air power and strategic alternatives in the 1960s. However, the detailed story and arguments used for and against both alternatives should clearly have relevance to any conceptual debates on carrier and land-based air power

The elements of maritime air power

This Master of Philosophy dissertation is about air power in maritime warfare. I have from academically studies and operational maritime aviation experience found that Maritime Air Power has through its short history fallen between the concepts and theories of sea and air power. It has often been narrowly described and defined - often with great differences between the naval and air services. Because of this lack of a common and cross-service definition, I have in this dissertation presented a description of Maritime Air Power based on purpose and objectives rather than viewing it from a perspective of service or platform. The definition argued was: "Maritime Air Power constitutes the parts of air power which are being applied in the maritime theatre to fulfil maritime objectives, as well as achieving the necessary degree of air control for maritime operations within this area of interest". Following this perspective, I have identified and argued all the elements that have to be included. The first element of Maritime Air Power is clearly the greater maritime objectives. This is important for the philosophical and strategical understanding. In the case study on the British forces of the period 1957-67, this was an era of great change. Secondly there is a set of elements described as the core capabilities of Maritime Air Power. These are Information Exploitation, Surface and Subsurface Warfare, and not at least Air Control Warfare. Force Projection has been reckoned as an important core capability of naval air power, but is not necessarily defined as Maritime Air Power. Within these core capabilities, or warfare areas - the span of practical roles of Maritime Air Power have been identified, and finally applied for the study of the British Maritime Air Power capabilities. Hopefully this dissertation will contribute to give a comprehensive perspective on Maritime Air Power - and not at least contribute to bridge the different perspectives, both on concepts and theories of sea and air power

The Northern Flank and High North Scenarios of the Cold War

Paper held at conference: «Peripherie oder Kontaktzone? Die NATO-Flanken 1961 bis 2013”, Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, Germany, 24. October 2013